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Violent upheavals took place in the 
Pacifi c Islands in 2006—the China-
town riots in Solomon Islands mid-
year, then “pro-democracy” riots 
in Tonga in November, and the Fiji 
coup mounted by Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama at year’s end. To varying 
degrees, these events caused political 
instability and immense damage to 
property and the economy (notably 
tourism), and tore the fabric of society. 
The scenes were reminiscent of the 
2000 coups in Suva and Honiara. 
Recent events provoked a similar 
response, with regional nations, 
mainly Australia and New Zealand, 
sending forces to quell the riots in 
Honiara and Nuku‘alofa, while the 
Fiji coup attracted condemnation 
and sanctions. Generic factors con-
tributing to security crises and the 
regional mechanisms for responding 
to them were addressed in an earlier 
review (von Strokirch 2001). National 
reviews elsewhere in this journal 
address the specifi c causes and con-
sequences of the 2006 events. This 
review focuses on region-wide chal-
lenges to sustainable development and 
the role of Northeast Asian states.
Management of two issues is 
critical to the survival of most Pacifi c 
Island states and their economies: 
climate change and fi sheries. They 
epitomize globalization in the islands, 
both in vulnerability to external forces 
and in the need for a global solution. 
To survive climate change, the Islands 
must adapt to effects that are, sadly, 
inevitable. But adaptation will be in 
vain unless urgent action is taken to 
reduce global greenhouse gas (ghg) 
emissions and stabilize the climate 
so that greater catastrophes can be 
avoided. Pacifi c Islanders are also 
preoccupied with sustainable use of 
regional fi sh stocks, notably the prized 
tuna. Due to the migratory nature of 
fi sh, and of the boats that hunt them, 
marine conservation requires global 
cooperation to support an effective 
regional organization.
In the review period of 2005 and 
2006, great attention was devoted 
to climate change, the related issue 
of natural hazard management, and 
fi sheries. At global and regional levels, 
conferences were held to assess prog-
ress and move international coop-
eration forward. Major reports by 
regional and UN agencies, nongovern-
mental organizations, and scholars fed 
global debates. In recognition of the 
worldwide dimension of these issues, 
and the two-way interaction between 
regional and global organizations, 
this review surveys trends at United 
Nations forums and the parallel evolu-
tion of international law.
Past reviews have looked at the 
role of established external actors in 
the Pacifi c in assisting or hindering 
regional goals. These actors are the 
colonial powers, morphed into aid 
donors: Australia, New Zealand, the 
United States, and France. This review 
examines the impact of China, Japan, 
and Taiwan. This Northeast Asian trio 
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has become more engaged, as refl ected 
in summits with Pacifi c Island leaders 
in 2006. They are competing, with 
each other and with traditional metro-
politan powers, for natural resources 
and diplomatic infl uence. Their uses 
of aid to achieve these objectives, and 
their records on climate change and 
fi sheries, are analyzed later in this 
review.
Small island states have long 
campaigned for international action 
to reduce ghg emissions and thereby 
mitigate climate change. So long as 
only the survival of atoll communities 
was perceived to be at stake, most of 
the world’s nations persisted with fos-
sil-fuel-intensive growth and its corol-
lary, burgeoning carbon emissions. 
Pacifi c Islanders can take heart that 
in 2006 global attitudes shifted. The 
balance of opinion among the mass 
media, the public, and thus politicians 
appears to be moving from skepticism 
to acknowledgment of global warm-
ing, its anthropogenic causes, and its 
likely consequences. This realization 
came about due to visible effects, 
popularization of the issue, awareness 
of the economic costs, and confi dence 
in models predicting the timing and 
scale of climate change.
Signifi cantly, climate change is 
being felt in the developed countries. 
Average temperatures are rising and 
extreme weather events have become 
more common and destructive. The 
European heat wave in 2003 killed 
35,000 people and resulted in agri-
cultural losses of us$15 billion (Stern 
2006, viii). Hurricane Katrina’s impact 
on the US Gulf Coast, notably the 
inundation of New Orleans, acted as 
a wake-up call that climate change is 
increasing the severity of cyclones to a 
scale that even a superpower has diffi -
culty coping with. Bushfi res are taking 
a greater toll than before. Moreover, 
the melting glaciers and polar ice 
sheets, shrinking permafrost, and 
retreat of mountain snow worldwide 
demonstrate the inexorable march of 
global warming.
Individual climate change cru-
saders have rendered this complex 
issue accessible to a lay audience. An 
Inconvenient Truth, the documentary 
fi lm by former US vice president and 
Democratic presidential candidate Al 
Gore (2006), received critical acclaim 
and reached cinemagoers the world 
over. Gore employed apocalyptic 
images to get the message across. He 
did so advisedly as the precautionary 
principle dictates that it is prudent to 
plan and act on the basis of the worst-
case scenario. Given the sway of skep-
tics in the media and in the corridors 
of power, both political and corporate, 
climate change “alarmists” provide 
correctives to public debate.
An offi cial UK report, the Stern 
Review: The Economics of Climate 
Change (2006), lent further gravitas 
to threat assessments and alerted 
the corporate world, whose support 
is critical to reduce emissions. The 
review assessed that a business-as-
usual approach could treble global 
ghg emissions within a century. The 
consequences are likened to the com-
bined effects of the two world wars 
and the Great Depression. Conversely, 
the cost of deep cuts in emissions is 
estimated in the vicinity of only 1 
percent of gross domestic product by 
2050 and would be compatible with 
continued growth. Stern sees interna-
tional cooperation as critical to the 
success of strategies such as carbon 
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pricing,  diffusing low-carbon technol-
ogy, curbing deforestation, and sup-
porting adaptation. The sooner such 
policies are applied across the globe, 
the greater the savings will be, whereas 
the longer the delay, the higher the 
cost of adaptation and future mitiga-
tion policies (Stern 2006).
In a similar vein, the European 
Renewable Energy Council (erec) has 
called for an “energy revolution.” A 
new approach stems as much from the 
need to ensure energy security (in view 
of fossil fuels getting scarcer and more 
costly) as it does from health and envi-
ronmental considerations. The council 
claims it is technically and economi-
cally feasible to cut global emissions 
50 percent by 2050, by shifting policy 
support to known renewable energy 
solutions coupled with far more effi -
cient use of energy (erec 2007, 4).
Climate change also affects the 
other traditional “high politics” issue: 
security. “The wider security impli-
cations of climate change have been 
largely ignored and seriously under-
estimated in public policy, academia 
and the media” (Dupont and Pearman 
2006, viii). Threats to security include 
scarcity of food, water, and energy, 
unregulated population movements, 
an increase in natural disasters, short-
term disease spikes, and a deteriorat-
ing capacity to meet basic needs. The 
cumulative impact is likely to result 
in more internal confl ict, failed states, 
and, albeit less likely, interstate war. 
Climate change thus must be factored 
into national, regional, and UN plan-
ning on security (Dupont and Pearman 
2006, ix). An adjustment in threat 
perceptions is warranted as climate 
change poses a far greater challenge to 
security than terrorism.
The latest report by the UN Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (ipcc) heightened public 
concern. It represents even greater 
 scientifi c certainty that global warm-
ing is caused by human activity, 
mainly from carbon dioxide emissions 
but also land clearing. They conclude 
that, “warming of the climate system 
is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and rising 
global mean sea level.” The total rise 
in temperature since 1850 is around 
0.76 degrees Celsius. The warming 
trend of the past 50 years is almost 
double that for the previous century, 
while 11 of the last 12 years rank 
among the 12 hottest years recorded 
(ipcc 2007, 4).
Of particular interest to small 
island states is the updated ipcc data 
on oceans and weather patterns. The 
ocean has been absorbing 80 percent 
of the additional heat thereby caus-
ing the water to expand and, coupled 
with ice cap and glacier melt, the sea 
level to rise. The twentieth-century rise 
in sea level is about 0.17 meters, but 
in the last decade it has increased to 
3.1 millimeters per annum, or nearly 
double the average for the previous 
forty years. “At continental, regional 
and ocean basin scales, numerous 
long-term changes in climate have 
been observed. These include changes 
in Arctic temperatures and in ice, 
widespread changes in precipitation 
amounts, ocean salinity, wind pat-
terns and aspects of extreme weather 
including droughts, heavy precipita-
tion, heat waves and intensity of tropi-
cal cyclones” (ipcc 2007, 5).
Future trends promise to get sig-
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nifi cantly worse as emissions increase, 
especially in developing countries, 
before global efforts can curtail them. 
Conservative models borne out by 
data in recent years suggest that the 
temperature will increase at least 0.2 
degrees Celsius a decade over the 
next twenty years. Tropical cyclones 
will become more intense and prob-
ably more frequent. In the long term, 
“anthropogenic warming and sea 
level rise would continue for centuries 
due to the timescales associated with 
climate processes and feedbacks, even 
if greenhouse gas concentrations were 
to be stabilized” (ipcc 2007, 12).
In short, trends have fi rmed as to 
the effects of climate change, not just 
on the environment, but also on the 
economy and security. Socioeconomic 
impacts are being felt throughout 
the world and are set to intensify 
within this generation. There is global 
cooperation, yet delays and divisions 
persist over strategies. Concluded in 
1997, the Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force in 2005. It comprises 165 mem-
bers, of which the developed countries 
are committed to reducing emissions 
by the fi rst phase of 2008–2012, by an 
average 5.2 percent compared to 1990 
levels. The European Union agreed to 
a higher target for itself: an 8 percent 
cut. Targets for further cuts in the 
second phase from 2013–2017 must 
be resolved by 2009 (erec 2007, 12). 
In early 2007, the European Union 
set itself a target of 20 percent below 
1990 levels, by the year 2020.
By contrast, the United States 
and Australia have not committed 
to any reductions. Working outside 
Kyoto (since they withdrew in 2001 
and 2002, respectively), they have 
expanded their clean energy initiative 
to include Japan, South Korea, China, 
and India. Instead of committing to 
cuts in emissions (Japan is the only one 
to do so in Kyoto), the Asia-Pacifi c Six 
(ap6) focus on development and dif-
fusion of cleaner energy technologies. 
This partnership unites three of the 
world’s biggest absolute ghg emitters 
—the United States, China, and India.
While the international community 
equivocates about the best way to 
tackle climate change and the urgency 
of the time frame, small islands the 
world over treat it as their top pri-
ority. This was evident in the 2005 
Mauritius Strategy for the Sustain-
able Development of Small Island 
Developing States, which revised the 
1994 Barbados Programme of Action. 
Climate change and sea-level rise was 
the fi rst major theme addressed in the 
new strategy and highlighted as a “key 
area” for action (ms 2005, 3, 21).
Climate change will undermine the 
development of all countries, but for 
many small island developing states, 
it threatens their very existence as 
sovereign states. That is not to say the 
whole community will perish, as the 
slow onset of sea-level rise will allow 
time for Islanders to migrate. The fi rst 
wave of climate change migration in 
the Pacifi c will see the inhabitants of 
Tokelau and Tuvalu go to New Zea-
land, while Marshall Islanders will go 
to the United States under the terms 
of the Compact of Free Association. 
Kiribati has yet to fi nd a home for its 
future refugees (Dupont and Pearman 
2006, 59).
Sea-level rise and weather patterns 
are a focus for Pacifi c Island countries 
(pics). Over fi fteen years the South 
Pacifi c Sea Level and Climate Moni-
toring Project has compiled a com-
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prehensive archive of data. In addi-
tion, the Global Climate Observation 
System has improved data collection 
via the Pacifi c Islands Action Plan. 
It undertook in-country workshops, 
renovated upper-air network stations, 
instigated subregional climate bulle-
tins, rescued paper records, improved 
interisland communications, and 
upgraded tide gauge stations (unfccc 
2007, 10).
In 2005 the Pacifi c Islands Forum 
endorsed the Pacifi c Islands Frame-
work for Action on Climate Change 
2006–2015 (pifacc 2005), building 
on a previous fi ve-year plan. In 2006, 
leaders identifi ed the framework as a 
priority for action under the Pacifi c 
Plan. The Secretariat of the Pacifi c 
Regional Environmental Programme 
was charged with translating the 
framework into progress on the 
ground (pif 2006, 3). The principles 
underpinning the goal of resilience 
to climate change are “implementing 
adaptation measures; [good] gover-
nance and decision making; improv-
ing understanding of climate change; 
education, training and awareness; 
contributing to global greenhouse gas 
reduction; partnerships and coopera-
tion” (pifacc 2005, 3).
In the Mauritius Strategy, small 
island developing states urged the 
international community to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol and make deeper cuts 
to emissions. With regard to clean 
energy, these island states saw it as 
incumbent on them, albeit with inter-
national support, to set an example 
(ms 2005, 4, 21), and this was reiter-
ated in the Pacifi c action plan. Rising 
fuel prices have added momentum to 
the quest for renewable energy. This 
led Forum leaders to call for an urgent 
meeting of regional energy ministers 
and for the South Pacifi c Applied Geo-
science Commission (sopac) to imple-
ment the new Pacifi c Regional Energy 
Policy (pif 2006, Annex A).
Pacifi c Islanders stress that their 
“contributions to the total global 
emission of greenhouse gases are 
insignifi cant” (pifacc 2005, 7). Their 
absolute emissions account for less 
than 1 percent of global ghg emis-
sions. Average Pacifi c Island per capita 
emissions are also low, at 0.96 tonnes 
of carbon dioxide a year, or just 25 
percent of the global average (unfccc 
2007, 8). This is due in part to differ-
ences in levels of development, with 
many Pacifi c Islanders making a living 
via traditional subsistence methods. 
Also, pics do not burn fossil fuels to 
heat homes as billions of people do in 
colder climes.
Yet the affl uent minority in the pics 
have a relatively high carbon “foot-
print,” due to consuming imported 
foods, driving cars, using air-con-
ditioning, and taking international 
fl ights. Moreover, most manufactured 
goods are made elsewhere, with 
emissions thus attributed to another 
country’s tally. It is also a paradox for 
pics that a main source of income is 
tourism, which relies on foreigners 
taking fossil-fuel-intensive, long-haul 
fl ights. In pursuit of development and 
foreign exchange, pics not only want 
to maintain the tourism industry, but 
to expand it.
Most pics, especially the urban 
capitals, import a large proportion 
of food. This adds to ghg emissions 
because of the processing, refrigera-
tion, and “food-miles” involved in 
the long-haul transport. As an energy-
effi ciency measure, but also to save 
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costs, improve the trade balance, and 
increase self-reliance, pics could try to 
increase domestic food supply. While 
options are limited on atolls, on vol-
canic islands there is scope for agri-
cultural producers to make a greater 
contribution, including exports to 
neighboring pics. Sustainable forestry 
in the pics would also help to preserve 
the global carbon sink.
Notwithstanding the value of 
sustainable energy use, the priority 
in Pacifi c Island responses to climate 
change is not curbing their own 
emissions, but adapting to sea-level 
rise and extreme weather events. 
While Islanders have always had to 
contend with natural disasters, these 
are exacerbated by global warming. 
Approaches to climate change adapta-
tion and disaster management have 
been converging in policy circles and 
are treated together here under the 
rubric of “risk management of natural 
hazards” (World Bank 2006, v). This 
represents an overarching approach to 
prevent or mitigate disasters.
By defi nition, disasters overwhelm 
local capacity to respond.  Nothing 
focuses the mind like a natural disas-
ter. A nation and its development 
partners can harness enormous energy 
and goodwill in response and recovery 
operations. Unfortunately, it is a quirk 
of human nature that often people will 
not institute optimal risk management 
until after they have experienced a 
natural disaster. However, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004, 
which killed 290,000 people, was on 
such a vast scale that it ensured the 
issue would receive more attention 
worldwide.
In 2005, disaster risk management 
was a key issue in meetings, resulting 
in frameworks and action plans at the 
global, regional, donor and national 
levels. Coincidentally, two meetings 
attended by Pacifi c Islanders were 
held within a month of the tsunami. 
In Mauritius, small island developing 
states gave disasters prominence as 
the second theme after climate change. 
The Second World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction, held in late Janu-
ary, produced the Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005–2015 (unisdr 2005). 
This revised the previous decade’s 
Yokohama Strategy. The 12th Pacifi c 
Regional Disaster Management meet-
ing, held in Madang in June, produced 
the Pacifi c Framework for the coming 
decade (sopac 2005). It was struc-
tured along the same lines as that of 
Hyogo. Forum leaders adopted the 
Pacifi c Framework in October (pif 
2005).
The cost of disasters in the Pacifi c 
Islands has already been immense and 
warrants greater risk management. 
Statistics illustrate the hazards to peo-
ple, property, and the economy. Since 
1950, disasters have affected more 
than 3.4 million people and caused 
1,747 fatalities in the region (fi gures 
exclude Papua New Guinea, as it 
would skew the regional outlook). 
Cyclones account for 76 percent of 
events, although droughts affect more 
people and tsunamis result in a higher 
death toll. The average cost of dam-
ages per cyclone was us$75.7 million, 
and in the 1990s disasters cost the 
region us$2.8 billion (fi gures at 2004 
value). Disasters incur ongoing losses 
to gross domestic product in the order 
of 2 to 7 percent. Melanesia experi-
ences the most disasters and fatalities, 
and Micronesia the least. Those with 
highly developed infrastructure, such 
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as Guam, suffer higher fi nancial costs 
(World Bank 2006, 1–2).
Disasters are becoming more 
intense in the Pacifi c, featuring stron-
ger wind speeds and higher waves 
associated with cyclones. Ten of the 
most extreme fi fteen events since 1950 
occurred in the last fi fteen years. In 
2005, the Cook Islands were hit by 
four cyclones at maximum Category 
5 strength in the space of a month 
(adb 2005). Disasters affect more 
people, in part due to urban popula-
tion density and substandard housing 
in coastal zones. However, fatalities 
have decreased, probably due to early 
warning systems (World Bank 2006, 
4–5). Unfortunately, while systems can 
give advance notice of Pacifi c-wide 
tsunamis, localized tsunamis allow no 
time for such warnings.
The increase in disasters is linked to 
global warming. In the Pacifi c Ocean, 
island air and sea surface tempera-
tures have increased more than global 
rates. Trends are set to worsen in line 
with ipcc predictions. The effects 
of cyclones are well known. Other 
extreme events include droughts in the 
Southern Pacifi c and fl oods in the Cen-
tral Equatorial Pacifi c. These effects 
are amplifi ed by the El Niño phenom-
enon, which, in worst-case scenarios, 
is predicted to become a permanent 
feature. Flooding increases the inci-
dence of vector (eg, mosquito) and 
waterborne diseases, which can cause 
epidemics. The intensifying threat of 
cyclones will also deter tourists and 
thus damage local economies (Tyndall 
Centre 2005, 26).
Climate change also imposes slow-
onset effects that are potentially more 
damaging to health, the economy, 
and the environment. With regard to 
water resources, sea-level rise intrudes 
on freshwater sources, while reduced 
rainfall causes problems with supply. 
Fisheries will be affected by rising 
temperatures killing sea grasses and 
coral on which fi sh depend, while an 
increase in toxic algae will contami-
nate more fi sh than usual. Altered tem-
peratures change the migration pat-
terns of fi sh, leading to less catch for 
some states. This is already occurring 
because of the El Niño effect. Tour-
ism will be affected adversely by loss 
of beaches due to sea-level rise, loss 
of attraction due to dying coral reefs, 
and severe damage to the environment 
and infrastructure due to cyclones. 
Settlements in coastal zones will be 
inundated by encroaching seas, result-
ing in costly relocation—or, for atoll 
communities, migration elsewhere. All 
of these translate into higher insurance 
payouts and rising premiums (Tyndall 
Centre 2005, 24).
Islanders cannot prevent new or 
intensifi ed hazards caused by climate 
change. However, some choices made 
by Islanders, individually or col-
lectively, do increase vulnerability. 
Building homes, hotels, and vital 
public infrastructure too close to the 
shore creates unnecessary risks. Allow-
ing such developments to erode the 
shoreline’s natural protection exacer-
bates the risks. Inappropriate archi-
tecture can increase susceptibility to 
the vagaries of climate. Urbanization 
can undermine people’s connections 
with traditions, such as the construc-
tion of housing using lightweight, 
local materials, which in the event of a 
disaster could limit injury and be read-
ily repaired. Loss of knowledge can be 
fatal in the case of tsunamis if, as hap-
pened with the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
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people fail to move to higher ground 
when the sea withdraws.
Disasters are not always inevitable; 
it is the natural hazard coupled with 
vulnerability that causes an extreme 
event to assume the proportions of 
a disaster (Tyndall Centre 2005, 
31). If the risks due to hazards are 
identifi ed and policies developed to 
reduce vulnerability, then a disaster 
can be avoided or at least mitigated. 
Yet many nations and communi-
ties allocate insuffi cient planning 
and resources to risk management 
in advance, even though this could 
reduce loss of life and property and 
would be more cost-effective than 
responding after a disaster.
Many constraints on risk manage-
ment are attitudinal. Humans fi nd 
it inherently diffi cult to plan for an 
extreme event when they do not know 
its scale, or when, where, and whom 
it will strike. We think a particular 
cyclone or tsunami might miss our 
country, our island, our house, or fall 
outside our lifetime or our period in 
government. Such uncertainty feeds a 
tendency to gamble with the risk and 
see what eventuates. Moreover, there 
is an assumption—vindicated to some 
extent—that insurance companies, 
communities, the national govern-
ment, or aid donors will cover the 
costs of response and recovery after a 
disaster. Indeed, until recently, donors 
did focus on responding to disasters 
rather than reducing the vulnerability 
to them. Typically, emergency actions 
by national governments and donors 
are more visible, and thus more 
rewarding politically, than complex 
long-term measures (Tyndall Centre 
2005, 10; World Bank 2006, 11–12).
There are ways to promote less 
risky mind-sets and behavior. One is 
to disseminate information that identi-
fi es vulnerability to hazards so that 
potential victims can understand the 
risks and the means to alleviate them. 
Another method is to encourage “no 
regrets” measures that are benefi cial to 
the community and the environment 
even in the absence of climate change. 
“No regrets” measures can include 
installing tanks to increase the water 
supply, planting mangroves to protect 
the shoreline, and planting drought-
resistant crops. Government regula-
tions and risk-management conditions 
on insurance policies can induce 
compliance with land-use practices 
and building standards that reduce 
vulnerability. Finally, “climate proof-
ing” can feature prominently in aid 
donor programs.
One successful stimulus is fi nan-
cial incentive. The World Bank 
documented the fi nancial benefi ts 
of “climate proofi ng” in the Pacifi c 
Islands and the Caribbean. Their 
conclusion was that the cost of early 
preventive action, preferably during 
construction, is invariably modest 
compared to the replacement value of 
infrastructure, particularly key public 
assets (World Bank 2006, 9). Effective 
risk management can also reduce the 
social impacts of stress, deprivation, 
and dislocation in the aftermath of a 
disaster.
Risk management of natural haz-
ards is now prominent on the agenda 
of aid donors, regional organizations, 
and Pacifi c Island governments. The 
generic framework for natural hazard 
management was devised at the global 
level over a decade ago, revised at 
Hyogo in 2005, and transposed into 
a framework for the Pacifi c Islands. 
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The campaign for better risk man-
agement in the Pacifi c has logically 
begun with an extensive process of 
research and consultation to identify 
vulnerability to natural hazards and 
ascertain solutions for specifi c com-
munities. The United Nations, World 
Bank, and Asian Development Bank 
have been undertaking research, pilot 
studies, and policy recommendations 
for several years.
The Federated States of Microne-
sia strategic plan of 2003 focused on 
climate proofi ng three sectors: infra-
structure, health (eg, malaria, dengue 
fever, and fi sh poisoning), and fi sher-
ies. In the same year the Cook Islands 
began to mainstream risk management 
of natural hazards into the national 
development strategy (adb 2005). 
As part of their National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action, Sämoa and 
Kiribati have engaged in community 
consultation and “hazard vulnerabil-
ity mapping” to identify priorities for 
action. Kiribati is implementing the 
second phase of its National Adapta-
tion Programme of Action from 2006 
to 2009 to design cost-effective adap-
tation measures. At a sectoral level, 
Fiji is adapting the tourism sector to 
climate change. At a cost of us$72.4 
million, the United Nations is admin-
istering a Pacifi c Islands Adaptation to 
Climate Change Project that involves 
ten pics (unfccc 2007, 21–22, 33).
It will take time for lessons learned 
in pilot studies to be emulated in 
national policy and community actions 
throughout the Pacifi c Islands. Never-
theless, all global, regional, and donor 
organizations now agree on the need 
for a comprehensive, whole-govern-
ment approach to risk management 
of natural hazards and for interaction 
with the community every step of the 
way. The Forum’s plan is indicative 
of this emphasis on “the integration 
of disaster risk reduction and disaster 
management into national sustainable 
development planning and decision-
making processes at all levels; and 
strengthening an effective partnership 
between all stakeholders” (sopac 
2005, 2).
In the Pacifi c Plan, “development 
and implementation of policies and 
plans for the mitigation and manage-
ment of natural disasters” are marked 
as a regional priority for “immediate 
implementation” from 2006 to 2008 
(pifs 2005). Specifi c strategies for 
pics to pursue are: “public aware-
ness, capacity building and improving 
governance, risk and vulnerability 
assessments, and, should a genuine 
need arise, consideration of measures 
to address population dislocation” 
(pifs 2005, Attachment a). The 
mainstreaming of risk management of 
natural hazards into national planning 
is a complex, long-term challenge that 
has been afforded priority in regional 
rhetoric and planning.
Apart from increasing natural 
hazards, climate change will adversely 
affect fi sh stocks, whereby rising 
temperatures and variations in salin-
ity damage the marine ecosystem. In 
addition to the anthropogenic contri-
bution to climate change, humans are 
wreaking massive damage on marine 
life by overfi shing. Developing coastal 
nations such as pics rely on fi sh as 
a key source of protein, and on fi sh 
exports and fi shing access fees as a 
major source of income. The Pacifi c 
Ocean’s fi sh stocks are relatively 
healthy, but the parlous state of the 
world’s fi sheries indicates what the 
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future holds unless fi sheries manage-
ment dramatically improves.
In 2005, the UN Food and Agri-
culture Organization (fao) concluded 
that 52 percent of global fi sh stocks 
were fully exploited and 25 percent 
were overexploited, depleted, or 
recovering. The remaining 23 per-
cent of fi sh stocks, assessed as under 
exploited or moderately exploited, and 
found mostly in the last frontier of 
the Pacifi c Ocean, are under mounting 
pressure (fao cited in gi 2007, 16). 
There has been a parallel decline in 
nontarget species and indeed damage 
to ecosystems due to fi shing practices.
The most severe pressure on marine 
life is overfi shing. Fish are taken in 
greater numbers than they repro-
duce. Statistics tell the story. World 
fi sh landings were about 20 million 
metric tonnes in 1950 but quadrupled 
to approximately 80 million tonnes 
in 1990, and remained at that level 
in 2002. This trend is partly due to 
growth in demand, but it also stems 
from a massive increase in capac-
ity—that is, the sheer number and size 
of fi shing vessels, with some 24,000 
boats in excess of 100 tonnes hunting 
the fi sh since the 1990s. Effi ciency has 
been enhanced by technology with 
global positioning systems, underwater 
imagery, and aerial or satellite obser-
vation used to locate fi sh. Increased 
capacity and effi ciency coupled with a 
plateau in the amount of fi sh landed 
suggests a decline in global fi sh stocks 
(gi 2007, 11). Over the past decade, 
many regional fi sheries have collapsed 
due to overfi shing.
There is colossal waste in the 
con temporary fi shing industry, with 
grievous environmental consequences. 
According to 2005 fao fi gures, 8 mil-
lion tonnes per annum, or 10 percent 
of world catch, is discarded (gi 2007, 
12). The bycatch includes whales, 
dolphins, and endangered albatross 
and turtles. Another global concern 
is “ghost fi shing” whereby hundreds 
of thousands of tonnes of lost or 
discarded nondegradable fi shing nets 
wreak death on all species in their 
path (unsg 2006, 12).
The real fi gures for global catch, 
and hence maximum sustainable 
yield, cannot be determined due to the 
prevalence of illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (iuu) fi shing. Unlicensed 
fi shermen are not the only culprits. 
There are also registered vessels with 
legal access exceeding their quota, 
fi shing outside the designated zone or 
season, using prohibited fi shing gear, 
not reporting their catch, and target-
ing species they do not have license 
to catch. One wasteful and inhumane 
practice, predominantly by Asian 
pirate fi shers, is that of de-fi nning 
sharks and tossing the often live bod-
ies back into the ocean.
The most insidious legal practice is 
deep-sea bottom trawling. UN Secre-
tary-General Kofi  Annan highlighted 
this problem. Bottom trawlers operate 
at depths down to 2,000 meters with 
nets up to 55 meters across and 12 
meters high. These traverse the seabed 
on giant rollers while trawl doors, 
weighing up to 6 tonnes, also scrape 
along the bottom (unsg 2006, 8). The 
effect is akin to that of a weapon of 
mass destruction, demolishing ancient 
coral reefs, giant sponge communities, 
and sea-grass beds. The benthic envi-
ronment accounts for 98 percent of 
marine species. Notwithstanding envi-
ronmental concerns, bottom trawling 
is unsustainable because deep-sea fi sh 
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are characterized by slow growth and 
low fecundity. The fi sh are rapidly 
depleted to commercial extinction, 
even within a single season. Whereas 
these fi sh species take decades to 
recover, coral recovery takes centuries 
(unsg 2006, 13, 15).
In the light of these alarming trends, 
fi sheries occupy a permanent spot on 
the agenda of the United Nations, its 
agencies, and many nongovernmental 
and regional organizations. There is 
also a complex array of international 
law and agreements on fi sheries. The 
1982 UN Law of the Sea established 
the Exclusive Economic Zones so criti-
cal for pics to obtain fi shing access 
fees. Initiatives since then include the 
fao Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries in 1995; the International 
Plan of Action on the Management of 
Fishing Capacity in 1999; the Interna-
tional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate iuu Fishing in 2001; 
and the fao High Seas Fishing Com-
pliance Agreement of 2002. Of great 
signifi cance was the 1995 UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement (entered into force 
in 2001) to manage straddling stocks 
and highly migratory fi sh such as tuna. 
In addition, Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organizations (rfmos) now 
encompass most of the ocean, though 
gaps remain on the high seas.
Global agencies, agreements, and 
rfmos have documented pressures 
on fi sh stocks and proposed strategies 
to render fi sheries sustainable. Strate-
gies to prevent overfi shing have been 
tried to varying extents, by states and 
rfmos. These methods include placing 
limits on the following: total allow-
able catch, national quotas, capacity 
(number and size of boats), length 
of the season, zones where fi sh can 
be caught, and the range of species. 
Modifi ed fi shing gear, such as larger-
size mesh in nets, can also minimize 
juvenile catch and bycatch. Turtle-
excluding devices are an example of a 
technology used to reduce casualties 
of a vulnerable species. Devices exist 
to deter seabirds. Bans on fl oating 
objects to attract shoals can slow 
down the catch rate. Marine Protected 
Areas, the aquatic version of national 
parks, can also conserve representative 
ecosystems and provide a haven for 
migratory fi sh.
Many measures can combat iuu 
fi shing. These include upgrading 
surveillance (eg, universal application 
of vessel monitoring systems), snap 
inspections, bans on transshipment of 
fi sh at sea (to stop “fi sh laundering”), 
blacklisting pirates, and refusing them 
access to ports or markets. All these 
methods can be effective, but often 
management strategies are couched 
in principles and guidelines that are 
not enforced. Kofi  Annan noted that 
rfmo management policies appear 
comprehensive but concluded: “it 
is diffi cult to assess . . . the extent 
to which these measures are being 
effectively implemented” (unsg 2006, 
37). In other words, awareness of the 
threats to world fi sheries and knowl-
edge of the solutions have not trans-
lated into effective action, especially 
on the high seas where a barely quali-
fi ed anarchy presides.
There are several proposals to 
improve on the unsatisfactory status 
quo. One recommendation of the 
UN secretary-general is to modernize 
Regional Fisheries Management Orga-
nizations to give them more teeth to 
actually implement strategies. rfmos 
are to be established for species or 
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ocean areas not yet covered and thus 
remove loopholes in the global regime, 
including an initiative by Australia 
and New Zealand in the Southern 
Pacifi c. Signifi cantly, the fi rst global 
rfmo gathering took place in Japan in 
January 2007 in an attempt to coordi-
nate the disparate regions. A review of 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, held in 
May 2006, called for states to “adopt 
and fully implement conservation and 
management measures for . . . fi sh 
stocks.” It urged cooperation between 
fi shing states and coastal states to 
harmonize measures between exclusive 
economic zones and the high seas. An 
urgent reduction was sought in the 
“capacity of the world’s fi shing fl eets 
commensurate with the sustainability 
of fi sh stocks.” Furthermore, it recom-
mended that all subsidies contribut-
ing to overcapacity be eliminated and 
iuu fi shing controls strengthened. 
Accurate, timely fi sheries data should 
be provided to authorities so sustain-
able catch levels can be determined. 
Finally, the review reiterated the need 
to reform rfmos and to render their 
allocation of fi shing access rights more 
transparent (unrcfsa 2006). Similar 
calls for “immediate action” were 
voiced in a consensus resolution for 
“sustainable fi sheries” passed by the 
UN General Assembly in December 
2006 (unga 2006). It is incumbent 
on states and rfmos to heed these 
directives. Unfortunately they are not 
legally binding.
A clear-cut binding agreement 
has been sought at the UN General 
Assembly for a ban on deep-sea bot-
tom trawling. Momentum has been 
building for a global moratorium. 
The Pacifi c Islands Forum is a lead-
ing advocate and issued a declaration 
to this effect (pif 2006, Annex b). 
Yet the fi nal unga resolution (2006) 
fell short. It merely urged members 
to protect deep-sea ecosystems and 
prohibit trawling where vulnerable 
species occur. High seas not managed 
by rfmos were left to the discretion of 
fi shing states to regulate (dscc 2006). 
Failing global action, Pacifi c leaders 
are considering a regional ban. The 
campaign was easy for pics to agree 
on, given that no commercial deep-
sea bottom trawling takes place in the 
Western Tropical Pacifi c region, as it is 
considered unviable there (spc 2005).
The Pacifi c Islands face essen-
tially the same challenges in fi sheries 
management as the rest of the interna-
tional community. pics mostly issue 
rights to distant-water fi shing nations 
rather than undertaking industrial-
scale fi shing themselves. Vessels belong 
to powerful nations, including key aid 
donors. This, coupled with meager 
pic resources for surveillance of vast 
exclusive economic zones, renders 
management of fi sh stocks diffi cult. 
Effective conservation of regional 
fi sheries has become critical, as foreign 
fl eets, both legal and illegal, have con-
verged on the Pacifi c since their own 
fi shing grounds were depleted.
Regionalism is not new to Pacifi c 
fi sheries. The Forum Fisheries Agency 
has been in operation for nearly 
three decades. There are long-stand-
ing subregional arrangements, and a 
collective deal has been made with the 
United States over access rights and 
fees. The Parties to the Nauru Agree-
ment are developing a new scheme 
to allocate fi shing rights in the form 
of vessel days. The biggest and most 
complex initiative was negotiation of 
the Western and Central Pacifi c Fisher-
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ies Convention between Pacifi c coastal 
states and fi shing nations, and the 
Western and Central Pacifi c Fisheries 
Commission (wcpfc) to administer 
the treaty (see von Strokirch 2001, 
2003). The convention was adopted 
in 2000 and entered into force in June 
2004. The fi rst wcpfc meeting was 
held in December 2004, ten years after 
negotiations for the Regional Fisheries 
Management Organization began.
The importance of an rfmo to con-
serve fi sh stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacifi c Ocean (wcpo) cannot 
be overstated. The wcpo contributes 
60 percent of canned tuna for the 
world market. For Pacifi c Islands, the 
income from the tuna catch in 2001 
was equivalent to 11 percent of their 
collective gross domestic product (gap 
2004, 5). The catch increased with the 
infl ux of foreign fl eets, but has settled 
at two million tonnes since 1998—
apart from a record catch in 2004, 
when the wcpo accounted for 78 
percent of the total Pacifi c Ocean tuna 
catch and 51 percent of the world 
catch of the four main targeted species 
(gap 2006). Since 1999, stakehold-
ers in the wcpo fi sheries have been 
urged repeatedly by their independent 
scientifi c advisers to limit fi shing. The 
United Nations has issued similar 
calls to rfmos. Instead, in the Pacifi c, 
vessels multiplied from 927 in 1999 to 
1,233 in 2002 (gap 2004, 13), while 
actual capacity undoubtedly increased 
even more due to larger boats with 
advanced technology.
Another concern is data on tuna 
stocks provided by the Standing Com-
mittee on Tuna and Billfi sh, renamed 
the Scientifi c Committee (sc) of the 
Western and Central Pacifi c Fisher-
ies Commission in 2005. In 1999 
they issued warnings of a substan-
tial decline in biomass and possible 
overfi shing for bigeye tuna. From 
2001 on, recommendations were made 
against any increase in the catch for 
bigeye and yellowfi n tuna. These two 
species represent a small share of the 
catch but are of high monetary value 
as sashimi. The assessment worsened 
to “overfi shing” of bigeye and yel-
lowfi n in 2003 and 2004, respec-
tively. “Urgent management action” 
was required to reduce catch of the 
overfi shed species to sustainable levels. 
The predominant skipjack tuna is not 
yet overfi shed, but fi shing for skipjack 
inevitably affects overfi shed species 
(sc cited in gap 2006). From the late 
1990s until 2005, despite warnings 
of imminent, and actual, overfi shing, 
there was no freeze, much less a reduc-
tion, in the catch.
Beyond the world’s insatiable appe-
tite for fi sh, the failure to enact timely 
conservation measures in the Western 
and Central Pacifi c Ocean was due to 
the absence of a Regional Fisheries 
Management Organization. The fi rst 
wcpfc meeting was held in December 
2004. This passed antipiracy measures 
under which members only authorize 
legitimate vessels, record their details, 
and ensure they are marked for identi-
fi cation. The following year, the fi sher-
ies commission set up its headquarters 
in Pohnpei, recruited staff, and sorted 
out fi nances. In December 2005, the 
fi sheries commission acted on the dire 
warnings concerning bigeye and yel-
lowfi n stocks. It adopted Conservation 
and Management Measures whereby 
“the total level of fi shing effort for 
bigeye and yellowfi n tuna in the Con-
vention Area shall not be increased.” 
Members were to ensure that, from 
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2006, fi shing of these two species did 
not exceed 2004 levels (wcpfc 2005). 
This was an encouraging fi rst step. Yet 
the cap fell short of sustainability, as 
2004 saw a record catch with purse 
seiners taking 15 percent more than 
the previous three-year average (Wil-
lock and Cartwright 2006, 15). With-
out a reduction, the wcpfc measure 
perpetuates a trend of overfi shing.
The third wcpfc meeting in 
December 2006 passed a panoply of 
binding measures to counteract Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated (iuu) 
fi shing. These include a Vessel Moni-
toring System to be activated by 1 Jan-
uary 2008 in a designated area, with 
coverage of the remaining area to be 
activated at a later date. It will apply 
to all vessels that fi sh on the high seas, 
but smaller vessels have until 2009 to 
comply. A Regional Observer Pro-
gramme will enable independent data 
collection and monitoring of compli-
ance. Moreover, procedures were 
established for boarding and inspec-
tion of vessels suspected of contraven-
ing the wcpfc rules. A formal list of 
known pirate-fi shing vessels was also 
instigated. All of the above are to 
deter or apprehend vessels engaged in 
iuu fi shing (wcpfc 2006).
The measures against iuu fi sh-
ing will reduce pressure on tuna and, 
incidentally, the bycatch of nontarget 
species. Yet there has been no reduc-
tion in the total allowable catch 
for the Western and Central Pacifi c 
Ocean, even though current rates are 
unsustainable. In 2005 the fi sheries 
commission did adopt a resolution to 
reduce “overcapacity” resulting from 
the increase in fi shing vessels since 
1999. This resolution is nonbinding 
and merely the latest in a series since 
1999 that have been ignored by many 
states and other “entities” (wcpfc 
2005). The principal means of reduc-
ing the catch, or preventing increases, 
is via a precise allocation of national 
fi shing quotas. To date the commis-
sion has not attempted this method. 
In other rfmos the issue of alloca-
tion is fraught and rarely resolved 
satisfactorily. The consequence is that 
too many boats chase too many fi sh 
until a reduction in catch is achieved 
by default because fi sh stocks are 
depleted.
In other rfmos there has been a 
common tendency to infl ate the catch 
level, against scientifi c advice, so as 
to maintain allocations for existing 
members, enable new members to 
join, or both. Alternatively, if mem bers 
see their historic allocation cut, new 
members feel they are not getting a 
fair share, or aspiring nonmembers are 
excluded, more often than not these 
states will ignore the allocation regime 
and determine quotas unilaterally. 
The prevailing attitude among states 
is that, where allocations are consid-
ered inadequate, they fi ght for bigger 
quotas. All these approaches result in 
unsustainable fi shing practices (Wil-
lock and Cartwright 2006, 13).
The outlook is mixed for a wcpfc 
allocation regime. Complicating fac-
tors are that the fi sheries are multispe-
cies, multigear, span high seas and 
exclusive economic zones, and feature 
tuna, whose patterns of recruitment 
and migration vary over time and 
space. Decisions on allocations, unlike 
the three-quarters majority needed 
for other measures, require consensus 
and can be held hostage by just one 
state. The ranks of potential spoilers 
are large. Distant-water fi shing nations 
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are notorious for resisting cuts. Pacifi c 
Islands are also loath to lose revenue 
from access fees and risk an associ-
ated diminution in aid, which is often 
linked to fi shing access. In the short 
term, pics thus have a vested interest 
in maintaining the overall catch level. 
There are signs in wcpfc decisions 
that, as developing coastal states, pics 
expect an exemption from reductions 
to domestic catch. 
On the positive side, all the pics 
and most of the key fi shing states are 
full members. (The US failure to ratify 
the convention is a notable exception.) 
They have also made good progress 
on measures essential to supporting an 
allocation regime. The issue of allo-
cation is high on the wcpfc agenda 
and New Zealand will table options 
for the 2007 meeting. It would be 
easier to arrive at a consensus now, 
when stocks of two key species are 
still healthy, than wait until stocks are 
overfi shed and drastic cuts to catch 
are required (Willock and Cartwright 
2006, 19).
Pacifi c Islanders are proud cus-
todians of the ocean. The pics took 
a stand on driftnet fi shing and led 
the world in banning it. They have 
consistently opposed nuclear activi-
ties that threaten the ocean. The 
United Nations has highlighted the pif 
Regional Ocean Policy as represent-
ing best practice principles for guiding 
stewardship of the sea. The Forum 
Fisheries Agency has long been a hive 
of research activity and innovation in 
fi sheries management. In 2005, pics 
reaffi rmed the importance of fi sher-
ies management by committing to a 
50 percent increase in their fi nancial 
contributions to the agency. In the 
same year, pics highlighted sustain-
able fi sheries as an immediate priority 
in the Pacifi c Plan. Individual pics, 
notably Palau, have been proactive 
with national marine conservation 
measures and diplomacy. All these 
conservation efforts are worthwhile. 
However, to a large extent they will be 
canceled out unless pics can be part 
of the solution rather than part of the 
problem of overfi shing. They, like the 
big fi shing nations, will have to accept 
short-term sacrifi ces to reap long-term 
rewards for their economies and the 
environment.
pics are central players in wcpo 
fi sheries as states that issue access 
rights, earn fees, manage domestic 
fi sheries, and are in the frontline for 
monitoring compliance. The pics have 
wcpfc voting rights. They also belong 
to other organizations with a voice 
in this domain, such as the Parties 
to the Nauru Agreement, the Pacifi c 
Community, the Pacifi c Islands Forum 
and its Forum Fisheries Agency, and 
various UN forums and agencies. Col-
lectively, pics could infl uence the size 
of the catch, notably advocacy for a 
sustainable yield. Otherwise, they will 
lose a major source of income if fi sh 
stocks become commercially unvi-
able. An Australian Fisheries minister 
summed up the challenge: “The Tuna 
Commission is a real chance to prop-
erly manage the last great fi shery in 
the world. The fi shery is OK now, but 
if we don’t do anything, in 20 years it 
will be devastated like all the others” 
(PM, July 2005).
The challenge for wcpo fi sheries 
has been capacity migration from 
elsewhere. Whether it be for fi sh, 
minerals, or forestry, as distant nations 
overexploited their own resources, 
they turned their sights on the Pacifi c. 
First came the Europeans, then Aus-
tralia and the United States, and now 
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the East Asians want a piece of the 
action. Due to its inter-war and World 
War Two presence in Micronesia, 
Japan has had a longstanding involve-
ment in the region. Notwithstanding 
Chinese settlement, the governments 
of China and Taiwan are more recent 
players. Access to the rich Pacifi c fi sh-
ing grounds is an objective common 
to all three Asian governments. They 
are also keen to garner diplomatic 
support for their global agendas in 
forums where the pics enjoy a vote. 
This Northeast Asian competition for 
infl uence produced a fl urry of summits 
in 2006, accompanied by dollops of 
new aid.
The year’s oriental diplomacy 
kicked off with China’s debut sum-
mit in April. It was held in Fiji with 
leaders of the pics that recognize the 
People’s Republic of China: Papua 
New Guinea, Sämoa, Tonga, Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia. The main 
outcome is the China–Pacifi c Island 
Countries Economic Development 
and Cooperation Guiding Framework 
to facilitate trade and investment. A 
new three-year aid package amounts 
to over us$300 million. Highlights 
include a fund to assist Chinese invest-
ment in the Pacifi c, free antimalarial 
medicines, and training for 2,000 
government offi cials. Countries with 
diplomatic ties to the People’s Repub-
lic of China are rewarded with zero 
tariff treatment to the “majority” of 
exports, cancellation of debts matur-
ing in 2005, and, for those not already 
enjoying it, approval as tourist desti-
nations for China (Wen 2006).
The summit signifi ed a cranking 
up of Chinese economic engagement, 
which was already substantial. Total 
trade between China and the fourteen 
developing Forum Island Countries 
grew from us$288 million in 2002 to 
us$850 million in 2005. Reciprocal 
trade was predicted to exceed us$1 
billion by the end of 2006, with the 
balance continuing to favor China. 
The nations accounting for the bulk 
of trade are Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
and Solomon Islands. Chinese invest-
ment in the Pacifi c Islands amounted 
to us$113 million in 2004 and was 
expected to reach us$176.3 million in 
2006. More tourists from China are 
arriving, with 35,000 in 2004 (most 
went to Fiji) and 46,000 expected in 
2006 (Somare 2006).
China has cultivated Pacifi c 
micro states to further its diplomatic 
ambitions. The key goal is to thwart 
Taiwan’s quest for recognition as a 
sovereign state. In 2006 China had 
the support of seven pics and Taiwan 
six, but this tally fl uctuates as pics 
play the two Chinas off against each 
other. In 2004, Kiribati switched sides 
to Taiwan, as did Vanuatu. However, 
Vanuatu Prime Minister Serge Vohor 
miscalculated in acting without cabi-
net support and lost offi ce. Vanuatu 
then renewed ties with China. Up to 
mid-2002, Nauru favored Taiwan, but 
then changed to China, only to revert 
to Taiwan in 2005. The prize from 
Taiwan was a new plane to relaunch 
Air Nauru. In 2005, China won a spat 
in the South Pacifi c Tourism Organi-
zation, which saw Taiwan expelled 
(IB, 16 March 2006). China also has 
an eye on its historic rival Japan. The 
Chinese summit was partly motivated 
by catch-up with the Japanese, who 
have been hosting such events since 
1997.
The Fourth Japan–Pacifi c Islands 
Forum Summit Meeting (palm) was 
held in May 2006 in Okinawa. Unlike 
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summits held by the two Chinas, 
leaders of all fourteen Forum Island 
Countries were in attendance. The 
leaders endorsed the “Okinawa Part-
nership.” The three-year aid package 
amounts to us$630 million, of which 
a major portion will be grants. The 
aid will focus on trade and investment, 
infrastructure, fi sheries, and tourism. 
Echoing the Chinese approach, but 
upping the ante, Japan will use Senior 
Volunteers to train more than 4,000 
people in the Forum Island Countries 
(mofa 2006a, 2006b).
Japan, too, is seeking pic support 
for diplomatic objectives beyond the 
region. Japan wants its status as a 
great power refl ected in the UN struc-
ture. The Okinawa leaders’ declara-
tion endorsed this aim: “Leaders of 
the pif reiterated their support on a 
bilateral basis for Japan’s bid for per-
manent membership of the UN Secu-
rity Council” (mofa 2006a). Later in 
the year Japan lost its tilt for a seat at 
the UN high table, but the issue is not 
going away.
Japan also wants support at the 
International Whaling Commission 
(iwc) to overturn the 1986 morato-
rium and approve commercial whal-
ing. In June 2006, for the fi rst time, 
Japan and its pro-whaling allies gained 
a majority, 33 to 32, in an iwc resolu-
tion to overturn the ban. This resolu-
tion is not binding, as it did not gain 
the three-quarters majority required. 
The St Kitts and Nevis Declaration 
issued a not-so-veiled threat that “the 
iwc can be saved from collapse only 
by . . . [allowing] controlled and sus-
tainable whaling.” It invoked “respect 
for cultural diversity and traditions of 
coastal peoples.” This statement was 
disingenuous, as subsistence whal-
ing by indigenous people is already 
allowed. In another appeal designed 
to resonate with Islanders, the declara-
tion claimed that “whales consume 
huge quantities of fi sh making the 
issue a matter of food security for 
coastal nations” (iwc 2006).
Six Pacifi c states voted for the St 
Kitts and Nevis Declaration: Kiribati, 
the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands. These 
are the same nations that recognize 
Taiwan. Also, fi ve are Micronesian 
neighbors that share a history with 
Japan dating back to the League of 
Nations–mandated territories and 
World War Two occupation. Their 
exclusive economic zones are among 
the largest and richest in fi sh stocks. 
All the Micronesians, bar Nauru, 
receive the lion’s share of their aid 
from Japan. This determined their 
votes, as Pacifi c Islands have no 
interest in whaling, on a cultural or 
commercial basis. Conversely, there is 
scope to promote whale watching as 
ecotourism. The multimillion-dollar 
whale-watching industry in Australia 
and the fl edgling one in Tonga are 
cases in point. Yet growing diplomatic 
support has emboldened Japan to dou-
ble their annual take of minke whales 
to 935 in 2006 and, from 2007, it will 
take 50 fi n whales and 50 humpback 
whales ( Johnson 2005).
Apart from being a major bilateral 
aid donor, over the past decade Japan 
has been the fourth largest donor to 
the Pacifi c Islands Forum Secretariat, 
having provided us$5.7 million since 
1997. Japan is the only country with 
which the Forum Chair has a standing 
arrangement to visit for annual high-
level discussions. From 1990 Japanese 
aid to the region had averaged about 
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us$100 million annually; however, 
in recent years that fi gure had begun 
to decline due to an overall cut to the 
Japanese aid budget. The increase in 
aid announced at the 2006 palm Sum-
mit suggests that levels to the pics are 
recovering again. A new consideration 
in aid allocations is competition with 
China, which Japan rightly perceives 
as an emerging superpower vying for 
infl uence in the Pacifi c Islands (mofa, 
cited in PM, Sept 2005).
Like China, Taiwan held its inau-
gural summit in 2006. The First 
Taiwan–Pacifi c Allies Summit was 
held in September in Koror, Palau. 
Not to be outdone by China, Taiwan 
sent its president, Chen Shui-bian, to 
meet the six heads of state. To China’s 
consternation, Fiji hedged its bets and 
sent representatives, but did not sign 
the communiqué. Taiwan trumped its 
neighbors by arranging to hold annual 
summits of leaders (the next will be in 
Majuro), in contrast to the schedule 
of meeting every three or four years 
favored by Tokyo and Beijing, respec-
tively. The Palau Declaration laid 
emphasis on law enforcement, digital 
government, tourism, health care, 
renewable energy, agriculture, and 
fi sheries (oprc 2006).
Sensitive to past allegations of 
checkbook diplomacy, Taiwan did not 
use the summit to broadcast new aid. 
Nevertheless, Taiwanese aid to the 
region has been increasing. The Mar-
shall Islands hit the jackpot with a Tai-
wanese commitment to their new trust 
fund of us$50 million, to be spread 
over the next twenty years (PM, June 
2005). The time lag is strategic, given 
the propensity of pics to chop and 
change between the two Chinas. Apart 
from Palau, in 2006 President Chen 
also made state visits to Nauru and, 
in May 2005, to the Marshall Islands, 
Tuvalu, and Kiribati. En route in 2005 
he made a controversial stop in Fiji, 
which does not recognize Taiwan but 
still holds meetings. It is little wonder 
that Taiwan devotes so much diplo-
macy to the Pacifi c when the region 
accounts for 6 of the 25 countries that 
recognize Taiwan.
It is interesting to compare the 
symbolism and rhetoric of the two 
Chinese summits. Both Asian leaders 
emphasized commonalities with Pacifi c 
microstates. The Chinese premier did 
so by reference to their experience as 
developing countries with aspirations 
for economic growth. Wen Jiabao also 
vowed that China would be a “reli-
able friend . . . forever” (Wen 2006). 
The Taiwanese president focused on 
shared ideology, implicitly denigrat-
ing the one-party Communist state 
with its questionable record on human 
rights. The Palau summit opened 
with a priest’s blessing, illustrating an 
important difference with China. The 
Palau Declaration made reference to 
“mutual democratic ideals” and to 
“democratic alliances” (oprc 2006). 
The touching allusions to common 
values, solidarity, and friendship at 
all three summits are in contrast to 
the Northeast Asian trio’s policies on 
issues of paramount signifi cance to the 
Pacifi c Islands, that is, climate change 
and fi sheries. Their actions in these 
areas, crucial to the region’s sustain-
able development, count for more 
than words.
Japan and China both have a mixed 
record on climate change, albeit in 
different ways. Japan has ratifi ed 
the Kyoto Protocol but used the US 
withdrawal as leverage to renegoti-
570 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
ate lower national targets and, in so 
doing, weakened the regime in spirit 
and substance. China, too, has ratifi ed 
the protocol and met its legal obli-
gations, but these do not extend to 
cutting emissions. In absolute terms, 
as a ghg emitter China has ranked 
second since 1995 and is set to surpass 
the United States by 2010. China’s 
pollution is a major contributor to the 
semipermanent brown haze that cov-
ers Asia. Following the US lead, China 
has committed to reducing the energy 
intensity of its economic growth, but 
not to cut overall emissions. Even 
though the emissions of develop-
ing countries will exceed those of 
the developed world by about 2012, 
China led 131 developing states at the 
2006 UN meeting in Nairobi in reject-
ing any targets for them, voluntary or 
otherwise (Christoff 2007).
China will not commit to ghg 
reductions unless the developed 
world signifi cantly increases transfers 
of clean-energy technology. Instead 
of working toward this within the 
protocol, China and Japan have joined 
the Asia-Pacifi c Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (ap6). They 
have thus lent legitimacy to an initia-
tive by the two Kyoto renegades, the 
United States and Australia, which 
duplicates the UN Clean Development 
Mechanism without setting reduction 
targets. Four key actors engaged with 
the Pacifi c Islands, where the threat 
of sea-level rise and extreme weather 
events is all too real and immediate, 
are dominating the ap6 group, whose 
effect is to undermine the sole, global 
binding agreement to stabilize, and 
ultimately cut, ghg emissions. The big 
emitters must return to the main game 
of Kyoto, agree to higher reductions 
by developed countries, set realistic 
targets for developing countries, and 
support massive investment in clean 
technology development and transfer 
to facilitate both sets of emissions 
targets.
The record of Northeast Asia 
on fi sheries has not been cause for 
celebration either. On the one hand, 
Japan, China, and Taiwan have 
brought revenue to Pacifi c Island 
governments in access fees and also 
aid, often tied to fi sheries access and 
spent on the fi sheries sector. Yet these 
gains are being negated by the dam-
age wrought by overfi shing. North-
east Asian nations are not the only 
ones preying on Pacifi c Island fi shing 
grounds. The European Union and the 
United States are big fi shing entities 
too, though their access deals are more 
transparent. Like Europe, East Asian 
nations have exhausted their coastal 
fi sheries and migrated elsewhere, 
including to the Western and Central 
Pacifi c. There has been an unsustain-
able increase in East Asian capacity, 
effort, and share of catch, including 
by states not focused on here, such as 
Thailand and Korea. East Asia now 
dominates the global fi sh-processing 
and export industry and is thus central 
to any efforts to regulate fi sheries.
China alone claims to have landed 
17 million metric tonnes of fi sh per 
annum since 1998, equivalent to 
nearly 20 percent of fi sh landed world-
wide. China acknowledged this was 
excessive and instituted a zero growth 
policy from the late 1990s. While this 
is encouraging, for world fi sheries to 
be sustainable, actual cuts are required 
by all nations. This applies to China 
too, which in 2002 became the largest 
fi sh exporter at 9 percent of world 
share. With 3 percent of market value, 
Taiwan also ranks among the top ten 
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exporters. China, like most developing 
countries, is mainly participating in 
the industry to export the fi sh (par-
ticularly valuable species like tuna) 
to developed countries. The Euro-
pean Union accounts for 39 percent 
of imports of the global fi sh catch, 
Japan 19 percent, the United States 
16 percent, while the rest of the world 
gets 26 percent—and the poor major-
ity world imports only 12 percent of 
total catch by value (gi 2007, 14–19). 
Japan outstrips all other countries in 
consumption, including a whopping 
30 percent of the world’s fresh and 
frozen tuna.
Beyond offi cial catch data, them-
selves unreliable, East Asian vessels 
are prominent in illegal fi shing. Green-
peace reports that “there is a general 
perception in the Pacifi c that distant 
water fi shing boats from Asia are less 
compliant than other fi shing nations. 
Based on arrests in the last fi ve years, 
the majority of fi shing vessels caught 
fi shing illegally in the region are 
from China, Taiwan, Indonesia and 
Korea. . . . [they] continue to oppose 
the stringent monitoring, control and 
surveillance measures required to 
effectively halt illegal fi shing” (gap 
2004, 7). If these states are really 
determined to demonstrate sover-
eignty, they could start by exercising 
control over their national fi shing ves-
sels in accordance with international 
law. The Asian aid donors could also 
contribute to an expensive item in fi sh-
eries management: surveillance. For 
example, Australia has funded Pacifi c 
patrol boats, while France, Australia, 
and New Zealand (through the franz 
agreement) do overfl ights of regional 
exclusive economic zones.
On Japan’s part, there have been 
large discrepancies between its 
reported catch and the amount sold 
in its domestic market. In 2006 it 
emerged that Japan had been covertly 
overfi shing southern bluefi n tuna for 
twenty years, to the tune of 100,000 
tonnes (worth us$6 billion) over its 
quota (abc 2006). Japan has also been 
resistant to the institution of bind-
ing conservation measures in rfmos, 
especially clear-cut quotas and reduc-
tions in catch. In deference to global 
concerns, Taiwan and Japan have 
committed to voluntary reductions of 
20 percent of vessels in their vast long-
line fl eets, the two largest in existence. 
This may reduce pressure on bigeye 
and yellowfi n in the Pacifi c, which are 
caught primarily by this gear type. In 
Taiwan’s case, longline fl eet reductions 
may be canceled out by the size of 
thirty-three new “super purse seiners” 
plying the Pacifi c (PM, Jan 2006). Tai-
wan also builds industrial fi shing ves-
sels for clients elsewhere. Vietnam is a 
worry too, as in 2005 it announced its 
intention to build, with French help, 
four hundred new deep-sea fi shing 
 vessels (gi 2007, 11).
All three Northeast Asian countries 
are notorious for offering aid to the 
pics, and other cash-poor nations, to 
obtain fi sheries access deals. Japan 
has forty “sweetheart deals” world-
wide, “camoufl aged under its offi cial 
development assistance and technical 
cooperation programs,” and many are 
in the Pacifi c (gi 2007, 59). Private 
Asian investment also facilitates 
access rights. In 2004, a Taiwanese 
company invested us$20 million in a 
tuna-processing plant in Papua New 
Guinea. Parties to the Nauru Agree-
ment explicitly give preferential access 
to nations that invest in their econo-
mies. Taiwan thus gained access to the 
Marshall Islands exclusive economic 
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zone for six purse seiners as a result of 
a private investment of us$600,000 
in the microstate’s national bank. 
Taiwan also sought to install a us$20 
million fl oating drydock in the Mar-
shall Islands but it was later rejected 
on environmental grounds (PM, Jan 
2006).
A high-ranking Japanese offi cial 
admitted that access to fi sh was the 
prime and abiding motivation for 
relations with the Pacifi c Islands, 
especially in Micronesia (PM, Sept 
2005). This refl ects the outlook of 
other Asian fi shing nations. In all 
three aid packages announced at the 
2006 Asian summits, fi sheries was 
prominent. It would be naïve to view 
large-scale aid and investment as 
simply a bonus beyond the negotiated 
fees. Increasing dependence on “gifts” 
raises expectations by donors that pics 
will fall in line on a range of issues. 
pics are under considerable pressure 
to grant licenses in excess of the fi sh 
stocks’ carrying capacity. Compound-
ing the scope for mismanagement and 
corruption is the fact that the process 
of granting licenses has been far from 
transparent. There is also a precedent 
with Japan’s expectation that pics 
receiving its aid should—and indeed 
now do—support its proposals in the 
International Whaling Commission. 
There is a danger that the quid pro 
quo will be called in for vital wcpfc 
decisions on fi sheries management, 
notably on the vexed issue of national 
quotas and reduction of catch.
The attitude of East Asian nations 
to international law in this domain 
does not bode well. Signifi cantly, 
China, as well as Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, have not ratifi ed the 
key global treaty: the 1995 UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement. Japan did so in 
2006. However, in addition to bilat-
eral access deals with the pics, China 
and Japan have ratifi ed the Western 
and Central Pacifi c Fisheries Conven-
tion, and Taiwan has an equivalent 
arrangement. This means pics do 
have leverage over the three Asian 
fi shing nations. Fishing rights could 
be explicitly linked to the Asian states 
engaging in conservation measures, 
exercising control over vessels, and 
supporting sustainable quotas, both 
in exclusive economic zones and on 
the high seas. pics must resist the 
temptation to grant preferential deals 
to aid donors. Inequitable allocations 
are virtually guaranteed to result in 
obstructive behavior in the Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization 
and fl outing of conservation measures, 
including quotas.
Pacifi c diplomacy with Asia does 
not occur in a vacuum. Reducing 
dependence on traditional donors is a 
major consideration. Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States have 
imposed strict conditions on aid to 
promote “good governance.” Fund-
ing has shifted to targeted and tightly 
audited projects. pics have courted 
new donors from Asia in part because 
they impose less onerous conditions. 
Indeed, for countries under audit by 
the United States or Australia, grant 
aid from Asia is often the only source 
for discretionary expenditure. More-
over, in keeping with their customs 
and strategic interests, Asian states 
refrain from comment on the internal 
affairs of other states. Consequently, 
at times when Australia and New 
Zealand have attempted to use aid or 
sanctions to promote accountability, 
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rule of law, human rights, or a return 
to democracy, recalcitrant Pacifi c lead-
ers have turned to Asian donors. In 
2006, awareness of the Asia card was 
evident in the rhetoric of Sogavare, 
Somare, and Bainimarama as they 
railed against criticism from Australia. 
Political ramifi cations aside, Asian 
states are not likely to be greater advo-
cates of environmental sustainability 
than traditional donors.
To conclude, there are remarkable 
similarities in the causes of climate 
change and overfi shing and, hence, 
in potential solutions. These crises 
are the result of population growth, 
industrialization, and rising per capita 
consumption, coupled with the relega-
tion of environmental management 
to market forces. The tragedy of the 
commons is that no value has been 
attributed to the environment. As a 
consequence, trends in carbon emis-
sions and fi sh exploitation are unsus-
tainable. Developed countries built 
their wealth exploiting fossil fuels, 
forests, and fi sheries. Per capita, the 
rich countries still consume far more 
energy and fi sh than the poor major-
ity world. It is a common refrain that 
the former must take responsibility for 
these unsustainable practices. Yet, led 
by East Asia, developing countries are 
following the same path. Nor are pics 
innocent bystanders. They are merely 
the last in line to cash in on exploita-
tion of natural resources. They too 
risk mortgaging their children’s futures 
for short-lived gains in growth and 
consumption.
The consequences of not taking 
corrective action on climate change 
and fi sheries will hit the pics earli-
est and hardest. Ultimately, inac-
tion will be extremely costly to the 
development and security of all states 
and irrevocably damage marine and 
terrestrial environments. The solu-
tions involve signifi cant cuts to ghg 
emissions and to the global fi sh catch, 
not just stabilization at existing levels, 
which are patently unsustainable. To 
ensure that cuts happen, there is a 
need for legally binding targets in a 
clear time frame, and compliance must 
be independently monitored. Vague 
voluntary goals and self-restraint by 
states have not worked in the past and 
there is no reason to expect otherwise 
in the future. Collective political will is 
needed to translate existing principles 
in international law, which are sound, 
into compliance with binding targets.
Both developed and developing 
countries must engage in reductions 
to ghg emissions and fi sh catch for 
global trends to return to something 
resembling a sustainable level. Debates 
about who has benefi ted more from 
fossil-fuel-intensive growth and his-
toric fi sh catches in absolute or per 
capita terms will not alter the fact 
that reductions are needed worldwide. 
To be feasible in poor countries, cuts 
require a concomitant transfer of 
resources from the developed coun-
tries for cleaner energy and for adap-
tation to climate change. This kind 
of assistance is occurring, but more 
is needed to induce real cuts to ghg 
emissions quickly.
Achieving restraint on fi sheries, like 
the Kyoto Protocol, will require pro-
portionately larger cuts to the catch 
of developed countries. These must be 
mirrored by cuts to their imports and 
consumption; otherwise developing 
countries will simply catch more fi sh 
to meet demand. To induce compli-
ance, the fi shing industry will want 
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compensation for foregone catch and 
for retraining people. pics and other 
developing coastal states will expect 
incentives in return for restraint in 
issuing fi shing rights. Nevertheless, 
all stakeholders will have to contrib-
ute. Like risk management of natural 
hazards, concerted action now on 
climate change and fi sheries will reap 
socioeconomic benefi ts for all in the 
long term. Given the vested interests 
involved across the board, the way 
forward behooves regional unity, 
donor assistance, and also parallel 
cooperation at the global level.
The Pacifi c Islands countries are 
not hapless victims. They are able to 
implement measures to manage natu-
ral hazards, thus preventing disasters 
or mitigating their costs. Similarly, 
they can pursue sustainable forestry 
and energy use while also combat-
ing global warming. The pics can 
be infl uential in fi sheries by virtue of 
their role in granting access rights and 
helping to set the agenda on conser-
vation. If the pics lobby collectively 
with like-minded wcpfc countries to 
reduce catch to sustainable levels, the 
commission might realize its potential 
as a model Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organization. pics could thus 
challenge the view that developing 
countries, large or small, are somehow 
exempt from taking responsibility. 
It is time that China, as the avowed 
friend of pics, ceased taking refuge 
in its “developing country” status. As 
the second greatest ghg emitter and 
single largest fi sh exporter, this nascent 
superpower must put its development 
on a sustainable footing. This could 
shame the United States into follow-
ing suit. If these two countries were to 
throw their weight behind multilateral 
efforts on climate change and fi sheries, 
prospects for the pics, and the world, 
would be much brighter.
karin von strokirch
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